

**In the name of Allah  
the most  
Compassionate and Merciful**

In the name of Allah,  
the most merciful, the most compassionate.

The victory of the Islamic Revolution shocked the East and the West, so that U.S. became frustrated with the failure of its intelligence apparatus in deterring revolutions. Despite its sophisticated methods, extensive resources and huge amount of accumulated experience, the C.I.A. failed to render a timely and correct analysis on the growth of the Islamic Revolution, its organization, leadership, and how it influenced the masses. The unmatched unity of our nation and their faith in victory, under the leadership of the Imam, provided the world with a unique pattern on bringing about an Islamic Revolution.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the Americans decided to correct their points of weakness, since their official sources including military and civilian officials of the former regime had lost their capabilities. Others like the Liberation Movement members who provided the U.S. wittingly or not, with all kinds of information in their official and unofficial meetings, were not able to satisfy the intelligence needs of the Americans.

Their growing enmity with Islam and the Islamic Revolution compelled them to hatch plots as a countermeasure, which in turn necessitated access to full and basic information on the integrity of the Revolution.

The counter-revolutionary forces move on to gain a better understanding of the social, economic, political and ideological gaps that may exist in revolutionary ranks. This pattern is not confined to counterrevolutionary forces in Iran, but all throughout the world popular movements face similar plots which aim at the following objectives:

- A) Identifying revolutionary figures and those who have entered their ranks with unrevolutionary attitudes.
- B) Use of all related information in their plots and conspiracies to divert the direction of a revolution. Western oriented figures are considered as the main hopes in this effort, and heavy investments are made for them to occupy key revolutionary positions.
- C) Use of information in forcefully countering a revolution, which include: overthrow, military aggression and the assassination of revolutionary leaders.
- D) Providing information to the political allies of the power whose interests are threatened. Similarity of interests and political goals in most cases urges the formation of an alliance of various countries and powers, to bring about a co-ordination which is essential in carrying out any common plot against a revolution. They exchange information in order to strengthen their co-ordination.

A document included in this book explains the issue clearly. It concerns the report of a briefing session held by C.I.A analysts for a Zeev Alon, MOSAD "Israeli Espionage Service" representative in C.I.A.

The close affiliation of MOSAD and C.I.A and their common espionage objectives in collecting information on the Palestinian revolution eliminates differences that may not only exist between America and Israel but also between their intelligence agencies, to enable them to function as one organization in carrying out a co-ordinated program.

Discovering, identifying and hiring of an information source within an organization are the most important and effective C.I.A measures, and the agency applies all sophisticated methods in this connection.

Usually other spies and sources identify a potential source, while necessary actions are taken to hire him only after full investigation is conducted on his personal background. The agency pays a lot of attention to certain personal characteristics that compell the individual to collaborate with those whom he used to look at as his staunch enemies at one time. these characteristics are as follows:

1. Common political positions usually are the most important cause of their collaboration with C.I.A. they consent to act as a spy and an information source for the C.I.A due to their faith in the western political system and culture. Amir Entezam and Moghaddam Maraghei ( see books No 10 and 24 of our publications ) fall in this category, because they voluntarily placed all information at the disposal of the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. Ideological frustration: Those who find unattended flows in the ideological approach of their respective organizations gradually become attracted to the opposition pole. Many of the C.I.A sources are the former hardline communists who were employed by the Agency, after their frustration with their own school of thought.

3. Financial needs: Financial needs sometimes urge an individual to volunteer for espionage. While approaching their sources, even those who are not in financial needs, C.I.A. officials provide them with gifts or wages in order to insure their collaboration.

Although the above points do not include all techniques exploited by intelligence agencies, they provide the basis for the introduction of the present book titled "Palestine- (3)" Book No. 44: PALESTINE (3).

This book contains documents related with a C.I.A operation aimed at collecting intelligence from within the Islamic Revolution. The main agent of this operation is unidentified, but the Central Intelligence Agency refers to him as "M.G.Barge/1" or "B/1". The documents generally include following information on him:

1. Membership in Fatah Organization: B/1 is a high ranking Fatah official, being perhaps the main reason for the C.I.A's attempt to hire him. He is also an expert on military training. According to a document: "B/1 and M/1 are in a position to be aware of all Fatah military training."

M/1 is another spy code named "M.G.Martyr/1" whose connection with B/1 will be explained in other sections.

2. The documents do not state when he was hired by the C.I.A, but reports indicate that he must have been a long time hireling. It should also be noted that the substantial part of these documents deal with Barge's activities in Iran, therefore his reports in other fields are not available at the Tehran intelligence collecting station.

3. How "Barge" came to Iran: following the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Islamic Republic's support for the Palestinian Revolution paved the way for a serious co-operation between the Islamic Revolution and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Thus a PLO delegation arrived in Iran to provide the Islamic Revolution Guards corps with the essential military training. Barge was a high ranking member and probably the head of the delegation.

4. According to another document Barge is seriously anti-communist, but no clue is given as to the reason for his opposition or attitude. This, however, has been an effective factor in his collaboration with C.I.A.

5. Barge's salary prior to May 22, 1979 was about 2000 Lebanese Lira, but the Central Intelligence Agency considered his financial problems and increased his salary to 4000 Lebanese Lira which is equal to Rials 100,000.

6. Although Iran was his main area of operation in 1979, the C.I.A station in Tehran was not responsible for establishing contacts with him. but due to the sensitivity of his connections with the agency, Beirut station got in touch with him through a third party, code-named " M.G.Martyr/1 ". In his contacts, M/1 would receive the code-written messages from B/1 and later submit them personally to the C.I.A officials.

7. Because of his critical mission and his membership in Fatah, B/1 was also in contact with the Palestinian Embassy in Tehran.

8. B/1's work facilitated his contacts with different C.I.A sections for which he collected information. A glance at the documents indicate that the collected information are usually on the following issues:

A-Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, its organization, number of personnel, arms, training, its significant figures, and finally the social and geographical strata the Guards belong to.

Since the Guards Corps comprises the front liners of the Islamic Revolution in confronting the counter-revolutionaries, all other forces intending to attack or counter the revolution, find the Corps " Sepah " as a consolidated embankment before them. therefore, in the first instance, they must collect basic information about the Guards Corps.

C.I.A, as the main intelligence front for the foreign based counter-revolution launched an operation to gain necessary knowledge on this newly established revolutionary institution, through Barge's good contacts with the Guards Corps.

Based on the exchanged information, one must admit that Barge's lack of intelligence, his unfamiliarity with the culture and attitude of the muslim revolutionaries, and lack of correct guidance from the C.I.A did not bring the success C.I.A expected to have through him.

B. Power system and sovereignty in Iran: Differences between the Imam and the provisional government, and the important clergymen's attitude towards the leader of the Islamic Revolution.

The newly established structure of the Islamic Republic, the unique leadership of the Imam which endowed it with the gift of stability, and the surprising spread of it outside the Iranian borders were always the main source of confusion for those who intended to analyse the revolution.

These factors on the one hand, and the unrivalled unity of our nation in the arena of their struggle for victory forced the anti-revolutionary plotters to revise their standard and out-dated conspiracies. C.I.A analysts, therefore, appealed to individuals like Barge, to have access to basic and essential information on the revolutionary circles. But C.I.A did not gain much in this field either, because Barge did not approach events dynamically.

C. A general situation report on Iran, the revolution, Khuzestan-related issues, and Kurdistan situation.

Excluding the Khuzestan issues on which Barge could have a positive operation due to his contacts with the PLO office in that province, Other reports included in this part were nothing but routine agenda for B/1. Because all C.I.A agents must dispatch their comments on the environment, and the activities that take place around them. Even these comments reflect Barge's personal understanding and are plagued with numberless deficiencies.

The only case in which Barge rendered an interesting analysis was his report on Tudeh Party, the reason being his anti-communist attitude.

#### Overview

As stated in the above, this book is about the operations of a PLO, Fatah member for the Central Intelligence Agency of America.

If Brage's espionage operations, and his position in P.L.O. are scrutinized carefully, one would wonder why he did all this. Why should he pretend to be struggling against Zionism and its advocate U.S.A, but in reality act as a direct spy for America and an indirect one for Zionism?

Is Zionism not the main enemy of the Palestinian nation and a usurper of their Lands?

The introduction of the book No. 42 titled Palestine ( 1 ) and its documents reflected the P.L.O functions and the prevailing attitude of its leadership.

Reliance on political games, foreign dependence, aimlessness and the absurd attempts of individuals and groups ruling over P.L.O forced the organization to invest on political maneuvers and to follow the same politics as those of the reactionary Arab regimes, instead of fighting the enemies of the Palestinian nation directly.

These groups will inflict a detrimental blow on the Quds liberating revolution. The C.I.A infiltration and the existence of agents such as Barge in the top decision-making echelons of these same Palestinian groups are the unquestionable results of the absence of an Islamic faith in the P.L.O's leadership hierarchy.

The Palestinian moslem revolutionaries must make a basic revision on groups that are acting as their representatives, otherwise, these same groups will further produce traitor elements like Barge and Martyr.

In the recent years, the activities of the above-mentioned elements have had a negative impact on the Palestinian revolution, and the following cases indicate that the revolution is being forced to make compromises:

- Abandonment of an armed struggle for political moves;
- Lack of a decisive stand against the Camp David conspiracy, and engaging, instead, in political rhetoric as the sole countermeasure;

Accepting the Fahad Plan as an implicit acceptance of the Camp David conspiracy;

Holding direct talks with U.S. puppets such as king Hossain on the formation of a joint Jordano-Palestinian confederation;

Evacuating Beirut and leaving it to the Zionist front;


Establishing close ties with the Egyption regime which has signed Camp David accords;

Launching all efforts to facilitate the return of Egypt to the Islamic fold;

Opposing the progressive frontline states;

By looking at the vague future based on these efforts, the Palestinian nation will certainly feel disappointed, but Almighty-Allah's promise for help will undoubtedly come true, and the brave sons and the unknown herose of Palestine will finally launch their real struggle, which is according to our Imam based on "the use of machine-guns that are only dependent on faith" may we witness the final victory of Islam.

Moslem students following the  
line of the Imam.



1. 33/56 S/I C R I T  
 2. THEY WILL HAVE MORTARS, BUT ONLY UP TO 82 MM - NO  
 3. TANK WEAPONS WILL BE PSA'S. THEY WILL HAVE 12.7 MM  
 4. TRAINING IS ON THESE WEAPONS, PLUS STREET FIGHTING.  
 5. HAVE MORE ON THE TRAINING AT A LATER DATE.

6. JAHARTYR/I ALSO SAID THAT KHOMEINI IS KEEPING DIRECT CONTROL  
 7. OVER THE REPUBLICAN GUARD, BUT ALSO OVER THE AIR FORCE.  
 8. NAVY IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT.

9. REQUIREMENTS REF C, PLUS THOSE IN DIRECTOR ASSISE, WERE  
 10. READ TO JAHARTYR/I FOR PASSAGE TO MUBARGE/I. WE HAD TRANSLATED  
 11. THE INFO/ARAPIC.

12. 4. FILEY 221-946977, 261-941491. RVW 11MAY59 RVW D9C.1 ALE CFFI  
 13. E C R I T

14. FOR E T 221820Z MAY 79 STAFF

15. SITE BAHUT 53948

16. TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

17. UNINTEL INTEL ARJICE MUBARGE

18. REFS: A. DIRECTOR 53861  
 19. B. TEHRAN 53868

20. 1. IN LAST MEETING WITH MUBARGE/I (8/71) WE WENT OVER  
 21. REQUIREMENTS POSED IN REFS. HE WILL ENDEAVOR TO OBTAIN  
 22. INFORMATION ON THOSE HE COULD NOT ANSWER.

23. 2. WHAT ARE THE LOCATIONS OF THE PLO TRAINING SITE.  
 24. THE PLO TRAINING TEAM IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING TRAINING  
 25. IN "ABBASABAD ARMY CAMP" THIS LOCATION IS ONLY TELEPHONIC  
 26. HOWEVER, AND S/I EXPECTS THE PRIMARY TRAINING SITE TO  
 27. MOVED TO AN AS YET UNDETERMINED LOCATION SOMETIME IN 1979.

28. 3. WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF PLO OFFICE IN AMMAN?  
 29. KHUZESTAN? S/I DOES NOT KNOW THE EXACT FUNCTION OF THIS  
 30. OFFICE. S/I ALSO DOES NOT KNOW WHAT SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES  
 31. THE OFFICE IS ENGAGED IN OR HOW MANY PALESTINIANS HAVE  
 32. BEEN SENT THERE. S/I COULD ONLY MAKE GENERAL COMMENTS ON  
 33. PALESTINIAN ACTIVITIES IN KHUZESTAN, SAYING THEY WERE  
 34. PLAYING A "GOOD ROLE." IN GENERAL, S/I SAID THAT PALES  
 35. EFFORTS IN KHUZESTAN HAD BEEN TO ACT AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN  
 36. THE PEOPLE ON ONE SIDE AND KHOMEINI AND THE GOVERNMENT  
 37. ON THE OTHER. THE OBJECTIVE ON THE PALESTINIAN EFFORTS  
 38. WAS TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN KHUZESTAN FROM BECOMING  
 39. S/I DOUBTED THAT ANY EFFORTS WERE BEING MADE IN KHUZESTAN  
 40. TO GAIN IRANIAN ADHERENCE FOR FIGHTING IN PALESTINE  
 41. IN ANY CASE, S/I KNEW OF NONE. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO  
 42. S/I, "LARGE" NUMBERS OF IRANIANS HAVE APPROACHED THE PLO  
 43. OFFICE IN TEHRAN VOLUNTEERING TO GO TO PALESTINE TO FIGHT.  
 44. THESE HAVE ALL BEEN REGISTERED, BUT THERE ARE NO CURRENT  
 45. PLANS TO SEND THEM TO PALESTINE. CONTINGENTS ARE BEING



PAGE 2 BEIRUT 53949 S E C R E T  
FOR THEIR USE, HOWEVER, IS BEING MADE BY THE PLO. B/1  
REITERATED THAT THERE WAS NO ACTIVE PLO EFFORT THAT HE  
KNEW OF IN IRAN TO RECRUIT FIGHTERS. KHOMEINI HAS OFFERED  
OTHER SUPPORT (MONEY) TO THE PALESTINIANS, BUT ARAFAAT HAS  
NOT ACCEPTED. B/1 HAS NOT DETAILS ON THIS. B/1 DID SAY  
THAT HANI AL-HASAN HAD ACTIVELY LOBBIED WITH KHOMEINI  
TO CUT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH EGYPT.

4. B/1 COULD NOT REALLY COMMENT ON YAZDI'S APPOINTMENT  
AS FOREIGN MINISTER. B/1 DID SAY THAT YAZDI WAS CLOSE TO  
BAZARGAN, WHO, IN TURN, HAD BEEN A GOOD FRIEND OF PRIOR  
MINISTER BAKTIAR. NONE OF WHOM WERE POPULAR WITH THE REVOLU-  
TIONARY GUARDS.

5. B/1 SAID THAT IN THE OPINION OF THE GOVERNMENT/  
RELIGIOUS FIGURES MOJAHEDI'S ASSASSINS WERE EITHER FORMER  
MEMBERS OF SAVAK OR COMMUNISTS. B/1, HOWEVER, KNEW OF  
NO HARD INFORMATION ON THEIR IDENTITIES. HE DID SAY THAT  
THE GOVERNMENT/KHOMEINI PLANNED "CRACK DOWN" (MURDER) ON  
THESE GROUPS.

6. B/1 SAYS THAT THERE ARE SOME SERIOUS DIFFERENCES  
BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND BAZARGAN, BUT THAT HE (B/1) DID NOT  
KNOW THE EXTENT OF THESE DIFFERENCES. ONE OF THE PRIMARY  
DIFFERENCES, HOWEVER, WAS OVER THE PRESENT USE, AND IN-  
FLUENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY  
COMMITTEES. BAZARGAN WANTED TO ELIMINATE THESE AS THE  
GOVERNMENT WAS PRACTICALLY POWERLESS. KHOMEINI, HOWEVER,  
WOULD NOT BOW TO BAZARGAN ON THIS. ALSO, B/1 SAID THAT  
BAZARGAN WANTS TO DECREASE THE PLO'S INFLUENCE WITHIN  
THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND ON KHOMEINI. BAZARGAN ALSO  
WANTS TO GIVE THE ARMY A MORE IMPORTANT ROLE. B/1 SAYS  
THAT WHILE BAZARGAN IS NOT AN ARDENT PLO'S SUPPORTER,  
NEITHER IS HE AGAINST THE PLO.

7. KHOMEINI, ACCORDING TO B/1, APPEARS TO BE IN VERY  
GOOD HEALTH. HE APPEARS ROBUST AND STRONG. B/1 BELIEVES  
THAT KHOMEINI WILL LIVE FOR A "LONG TIME". KHOMEINI'S  
DIET CONSISTS MAINLY OF MILK AND WHEAT, AND LITTLE ELSE.  
HE EATS VERY LITTLE MEAT.

PAGE 3 BEIRUT 53949 S E C R E T  
B/1 HAD NO INFORMATION ON AUTONOMY MOVEMENTS AMONG  
THE MINORITIES. B/1 DID STATE THAT CURRENT PLO POLICY  
WAS TO FAVOR KHOMEINI AND NOT TO BACK THE MINORITIES.

9. THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS ARE NOW BEING TRAINED  
AT THE ABBASABAD COMPOUND. THERE IS ALSO SOME TRAINING  
CONDUCTED AT THE WAR COLLEGE. ANOTHER TRAINING AREA IS  
BEING PLANNED FOR MESHEH, AND, EVENTUALLY, TRAINING  
SITES WILL BE ESTABLISHED THROUGHOUT IRAN. AS STATED IN  
PARA 2, THE SITE AT THE ABBASABAD COMPOUND WILL SOON  
BE TRANSFERRED.

10. NO PLO TRAINING TEAM MEMBERS ARE AT THE GULF  
DISTRICT COMPOUND AND B/1 DOES NOT KNOW IT. CONCERNING  
COMPOUNDS HE HAS SEEN (ABBASABAD). B/1 STATES THAT ALL  
OFFICES HAVE BEEN BROKEN INTO. SOME SAFES HAVE ALSO BEEN  
BROKEN INTO, BUT MOST HAVE NOT. ATTEMPTS USUALLY  
CONSISTED OF TRYING TO SHOOT OFF THE COMBINATION LOCKS.  
B/1 WILL TRY TO FIND OUT MORE.

11. THE PLO TRAINING TEAM IS CURRENTLY HOUSED IN THREE  
LOCATIONS. ONE GROUP IS IN THE TAJRISH AREA, ANOTHER IS  
IN THE SHENIRAN AREA, AND THE VILLA IN WHICH THE MISSION  
HEADQUARTERED, AND IN WHICH B/1 LIVES, IS LOCATED ON  
FERESHTEH STREET, AT THE TOP OF JORDAN STREET.

12. B/1 ALSO SAID THAT THE PLO DOES NOT AS YET HAVE  
ANY INFLUENCE OVER THE ASSIGNMENT OF PALESTINIAN TECH-  
NICIANS TO WORK IN THE OIL FIELDS, BUT THAT THE PLO IS  
WORKING TO OBTAIN SUCH INFLUENCE. THEY EXPECT THAT  
KHOMEINI WILL GRANT THEM SOME SORT SAY ON THIS MATTER  
IN THE FUTURE.

13. WE ARE PUTTING DETAILS OF TRAINING AND ORGANI-  
ZATION OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS INTO SEPARATE CABLE.

14. FILE: 201-945977. RWV 22 MAY 69. DRV DGC.

ALL SECRET  
S E C R E T

23 MAY 79 02  
SECRET 2223412 MAY 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 443645.

TO: IMMEDIATE BEIRUT INFO TEHRAN.

UNINTL ARJUCE MJBARGE

REF: BEIRUT 53949

1. PROPOSE ASSIST MJBARGE/1 IN HIS FINANCIAL STRAITS AS FOLLOWS:

A. DOUBLE HIS SALARY (RETROACTIVE TO THE TIME HE ARRIVED TEHRAN) TO LL 4,000 RPT LL 4,000 FOR THE TIME HE REMAINS IN IRAN.

B. ADVANCE HIM THE 30,000 RYALS (APPROX U.S. \$1,000) HE REPAID FROM HIS MONTHLY SALARY.

C. HAVE HIM REPAY SALARY ADVANCE FROM INTEREST WHILE IN TEHRAN, AT THE RATE OF LL 2,000 RPT LL 2,000/100. RETURNS PCS FROM TEHRAN BEFORE ADVANCE REPAID. NEGOTIATE THE TERMS FOR THE REPAYMENT OF THE BALANCE OF HIS SALARY ADVANCE FROM HIS NORMAL LL 2,000/100 SALARY.

2. IF ABOVE ACCEPTABLE TO STATION AND MJBARGE/1, ADVISE HIS MOC TO REFLECT ABOVE. PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE: 201-046-77. RVW 22M T99 19001 AND 19002

SECRET

BT  
#2459

SECRET 230925Z MAY 79 STAFF

CITE BEIRUT 53953

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

UNINTL INTEL AJAJA MJBARGE

REF: DIRECTOR 435108

1. MJBARGE/1 (B/1) RESPONSES TO PARA 2 REF REQUIREMENTS, CONCERNING ACTIVITIES OF KHOMEINI SUPPORTERS IN LEBANON, ARE SET FORTH BELOW. B/1'S KNOWLEDGE ON THIS SUBJECT IS RATHER LIMITED.

2. B/1 IDENTIFIES THE "AL-AZAR" ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AS BEING AN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT MADE UP OF FARSI FOLLOWERS OF KHOMEINI. HE WOULD NOT PROVIDE INFORMATION CONCERNING ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH "AMAL" OR DETAILING ITS SUPPORT FROM KHOMEINI.

3. OTHER THAN SAYING THAT HUSAIN-AL-HUSAYNI HAD A "GOOD" RELATIONSHIP WITH KHOMEINI, B/1 WOULD NOT PROVIDE ANY DETAILS OF THAT RELATIONSHIP.

4. B/1 SAYS THAT KHOMEINI, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, WANT TO EXPORT THEIR REVOLUTION TO ALL MUSLIM COUNTRIES. B/1 HAS HEARD KHOMEINI SPEAK ON THE SUBJECT AND KHOMEINI HAS MENTIONED EXPORTING THE REVOLUTION NOT ONLY TO LEBANON, BUT ALSO TO IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, INDIA, PAKISTAN, AFRICA, CHINA, AND EVEN TO THE PHILIPPINES. B/1 DOES NOT KNOW KHOMEINI'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, NOR DOES HE HAVE AN IDEA AS TO THE ROLE WHICH KHOMEINI ENVISIONS FOR LEBANON'S SH

5. B/1 SAID THAT THERE IS VERY LITTLE COORDINATION OF GOOD MILITARILY BETWEEN FATAH AND "AMAL". POLITICAL TIES ARE SLIGHTER, BUT ARE STILL VERY SLIGHT. B/1 SAID HE COULD NOT ESTIMATE THE STRENGTH OF "AMAL", BUT HE DID KNOW THAT IT HAD INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THE DISAPPEARANCE OF MUSABADR.

6. B/1 BELIEVES THAT IRANIAN SPY AGENTS ARE CONTINUALLY VISITING

PAGE 2 BEIRUT 53953 S E C R E T  
LEBANON IN ORDER TO ASSESS THE SITUATION, BUT HE HAS NO OFFICIAL  
INFORMATION THAT THIS IS TRUE.

7. KHOMEINI DOES NOT HAVE ANY OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES IN  
LEBANON, ACCORDING TO B/I. HOWEVER, LEBANESE SHIA (B/I  
HAS NO IDENTIFICATIONS) ARE REPORTING TO KHOMEINI ON THE  
SITUATION IN LEBANON. THESE SHIA COME FROM WITHIN TAMA  
AND FROM WITHOUT THAT ORGANIZATION.

KHOMEINI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SYRIA IS NOT VERY FAVORABLE  
AS HE CONSIDERS THE ALAWITES HERETICS. B/I SAYS HE WAS TOLD  
HANI AL-HASAN THAT THE PURPOSE OF AHMAD ISMA'IL AHMAD'S MID-  
APRIL TRIP TO TEHRAN WAS TO ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN  
SYRIA AND KHOMEINI. HASAN WAS AT THE AIRPORT TO GREET AHMAD  
B/I COULD NOT COMMENT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIP.

9. B/I ALSO SAID THAT KHOMEINI IS NOT PLEASED WITH IRAQ.  
THIS DISPLEASURE IS BASED ON IRAQ'S COOPERATION WITH THE SHAH  
OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS. KHOMEINI ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE  
IRAQI SHIA ARE THREATENED BY THE IRAQI REGIME.

10. WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE B/I ATTEMPT TO SERVICE REF  
REQUIREMENTS IN MORE DETAIL.

11. FILE: 221-946977. RVW 23 MAY 69 DRV DGC, 1 ALL SECRET  
S E C R E T

SECRET 241100Z MAY 79 STAFF

OUT: BEIRUT 53957

FOR DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

INTEL AND INFO TO IRG

FROM: A. DIRECTOR 241100Z  
E. BEIRUT 53949

WE GREATLY APPRECIATE PROMPT REPLY AND HEADQUARTERS REQUEST  
FOR LARGE (B/I) FINANCIAL PROBLEMS. PLEASE ADVISE B/I'S  
TO REFLECT REF A PROPOSAL, WHICH BOTH STATION AND B/I FIND  
NOT ACCEPTABLE.

B/I TOLD US LATELY THAT HE HAS NOW BEEN ASKED TO RETURN  
TEHRAN BY TEN TO TWENTY DAYS. OUR NEXT MEETING IS SCHEDULED  
FOR 11 JUNE. AND B/I WILL USE CALL IN TEHRAN IF HE LEAVES BEFORE  
THAT TIME. HE WILL TRY TO CALL IN THREE OR FOUR DAYS PRIOR TO  
DEPARTURE.

FILE: 221-946977, RVW 24 MAY 69 DRV DGC, 1 ALL SECRET



TO: SECRET INFO DIRECTOR.

MINUTE JUNE 1968

FILE: 21 Inst 24314

1. IF POSSIBLE, INCLUDE SOME OF FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN YOUR  
NEXT TRANSMITTING APPROPRIATE CORRESPONDENCE. IF YOU  
HAVE NOT ALREADY ANSWERED, AND WHEN YOU CONSIDER APPROPRIATE.

WITH SIGNS IN PERSIAN AND/ OR I LOOK DOES MAKE LARGE IN  
POLICY DECISIONS  
INFLUENCE WITH VARIOUS WHICH ONE MAKES  
UNITIES DECISIONS  
REVELATION RISING CONSPIRACY AND  
RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE  
REVELATIONARY COUNCIL AS A JAGGED  
ONE THAT SEVERAL  
RESEARCH AND PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL  
CAREERS LEVEL

Q. WHAT IS THE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR PERSONNEL WHO  
S. IT HOW MANY PERSONNEL ARE THERE? NO. 100  
MEN AND WOMEN? WHAT ARE THEIR SOCIAL  
AND ARE THERE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN  
NO. 100? WHO?

1. C. WHAT ARE RELATIONSHIPS (AMONG AND BETWEEN MEMBERS OF  
ASAPARA, ARMY, AND POLICE AND CIVILIAN PARTLY AND FULLY  
REVEAL?

HOW IS PASADENA DISCIPLINE WHAT IS PASADENA FOR THE  
UNEMPLOYMENT AGAINST ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION

1. WHAT ARE IDENTITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF ALL PERSONS WORKING IN IRAN?

2. NO FILE. NOW 26JUL99. DRV DS

\_\_\_\_\_

SECRET 110702Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 493593. SECTION 1 OF 2.

TO: TEL AVIV INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM,  
TEHRAN.

FM: NE/ISR INFO NE/EL, NE/EL, NE/PAL, NE/INTEL, NE/IRAG,  
NIO/NE SA, OPA/ME

SUBJECT: WMINTEL - MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING

1. THE MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING WAS HELD AT HEADQUARTERS ON 9 AUGUST 1979 FOR MOSCOW REP ZEEV ALLON. LIAISON AGENDA YK/2A/836/79 WAS USED AS BASIS FOR THE BRIEFING.

2. PRIOR TO THE MEETING, CAME/ISR EXPLAINED TO ALLON THAT WE WANTED TO OMIT DISCUSSING THE SECTION ON EGYPT AND UN RESOLUTION 242 AS THIS WAS A POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ISSUE BEING HANDLED AT HIGHER ECHELONS AND IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR US TO COMMENT.

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

3. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION PENDING FROM THE LAST MEETING ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN TURKEY, THE INPAC ANALYST SAID THAT THIS EXISTENCE CANNOT BE CONFIRMED IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. THE BROTHERHOOD'S POTENTIAL FOR EXISTENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF AND THE NATIVE ALAWITE POPULATION IN TURKEY. THERE ARE RELIGIOUSLY CONSERVATIVE SUNNI ELEMENTS THAT WOULD LIKE THE BROTHERHOOD TO EXIST. HOWEVER, THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IS A VERY FRAGILE ONE THAT DEPENDS ON HETERODOX ALAVI, WHICH ARE SHI'ITE ORIENTED, FOR SUPPORT. IF THE PRESENT TURKEY GOVERNMENT WERE TO GIVE ASYLUM OR HINT OF ASYLUM TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD THE GOVERNMENT WOULD LOSE SUPPORT OF THE ALAVI GROUP. THE REASON THE ALAVI ARE SO SENSITIVE IS BECAUSE THE CURRENT STATE OF MARTIAL LAW WAS ACTUALLY SPARKED BY CLASHES BETWEEN THE SUNNIST EXTREMISTS AND THE ALAVI IN EASTERN TURKEY. SHOULD THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY COLLAPSE AND SHOULD A MORE

PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 493393 SECRET  
CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT BE INSTALLED, THE CHANCES FOR THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ARE EQUALLY POOR BECAUSE  
OF THE MILITARY, WHICH IS A HIGHLY SECULAR FORCE AND WHICH WOULD  
RAISE BEHIND-THE-SCENES OBJECTIONS.

4. ACCORDING TO THE NFAC ANALYST, SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD  
HAS FELT THAT THE CLASHES IN TURKEY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO SUNNI-  
ALAWITE TENSIONS IN SYRIA. THE ALAWI IN TURKEY AND THE ALAWITE  
FORM THE LARGEST NON-SUNNI ELEMENT. THIS ELEMENT IS VERY VISIBLE  
AND IS NOT LOST ON ASSAD. BOTH SYRIA AND TURKEY HAVE A SUNNI  
MAJORITY. THE NFAC ANALYST SAID THAT ANY UNOFFICIAL SHELTER  
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD MIGHT FIND IN TURKEY EXISTS IN THE  
SOUTHERN PROVINCE AREA THAT BORDERS SYRIA DIRECTLY. SMUGGLERS  
LOCATED IN THIS AREA PROBABLY CONSIDER THEMSELVES NEITHER  
TURKS NOR SYRIANS AND WOULD LIKELY BE THE GROUP TO GIVE ASYLUM.

PLO

5. REGARDING LIAISON'S QUESTION ABOUT THE PLO'S  
INVOLVEMENT IN MOVES/FEELERS TO INTEGRATE INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS,  
THE ANALYST SAID WE SEE CURRENT PLO INVOLVEMENT IN A BROADER  
CONTEXT. WE FEEL THE INITIATIVES AT THE UN AND IN WEST  
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED CHIEFLY BY ARAFAT, WHO  
HAS ACTED WITH VERY LITTLE CONSULTATION WITH OTHER PLO LEADERS.  
ONE OF ARAFAT'S GOALS IS TO HAVE AS MANY OPTIONS AS POSSIBLE  
DURING THE PEACE PROCESS. EVEN IF THE UN INITIATIVE IS ACCEPTED  
AND THE RESOLUTION IS PASSED, WE MAY NOT SEE ANY IMMEDIATE MOVES  
TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE PEACE PROCESS. THERE ARE LIKELY  
OTHER ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED FIRST. ARAFAT'S VIEWS MAY DIFFER  
WITH THOSE OF OTHER PLO LEADERS, BUT WE WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL  
THE RESOLUTION WERE ACTUALLY PASSED BEFORE WE COULD KNOW WHAT  
THE VIEWS ARE OF OTHER PLO OFFICIALS.

6. ON 11 AUGUST THE PLO CENTRAL COUNCIL WILL MEET.  
ACCORDING TO THE NFAC ANALYST, ARAFAT REALIZES THAT A PROPOSAL  
FOR PLO INVOLVEMENT IN PRESENT AUTONOMY TALKS WOULD SPILT THE  
PLO. WE DO NOT THINK THIS WILL EVOLVE. WE THINK ARAFAT WANTS  
TO EXPLORE ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF ADVANCING PALESTINIAN POLITICAL  
RIGHTS SHOULD THE AUTONOMY TALKS NOT WORK OUT. ARAFAT'S GOALS  
ARE TO GAIN WIDE RECOGNITION AND INCREASED CONTACTS WITH THE

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WEST. LOOKING BEYOND THE MAY DEADLINE FOR THE AUTONOMY TALKS,  
ARAFAT SEES TWO POSSIBLE OUTCOMES SHOULD THE TALKS FAIL TO GAIN  
AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT FOR THE PALESTINIANS: A) A STRONGER  
REJECTIONIST STANCE, DIRECTED ALSO AGAINST THE UNITED STATES  
AND B) ACQUIESCENCE, WHICH WOULD MAKE ARAFAT APPEAR TO BE A LEA-  
DER WHO DID NOT DIRECT THE COURSE OF EVENTS. FOR THESE  
REASONS ARAFAT WANTS TO EXPLORE MEANS OF CONTINUING HIS  
INVOLVEMENT AND ENHANCING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCEPTABLE  
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AT A FUTURE DATE. HENCE, ARAFAT'S EFFORT  
TO GAIN U.S. RECOGNITION AND TO INCREASE CONTACTS WITH WEST  
EUROPEAN LEADERS.

7. AS FOR ACTIONS BEING TAKEN BY ORGANIZATIONS THAT OPPOSE  
ARAFAT'S INITIATIVES, THE NFAC ANALYST SAID THE STANCE OF  
OPPOSITION GROUPS DEALS NOT WITH CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS BUT WITH  
RESOLUTION BUILDING ON 242. REGARDING THE QUESTION OF WHAT  
OPPOSITION GROUPS WOULD JOIN WITH ARAFAT, THE NFAC ANALYST  
SAID THIS WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT CONCESSIONS WERE MADE BY THE  
WEST SHOULD ARAFAT ACCEPT RESOLUTION 242. SYRIA AND SAUDI  
WOULD BE THE KEY TO PLO ACCEPTANCE OF ARAFAT'S PROPOSAL ON  
242. WITHOUT SYRIA AND SAUDI, ARAFAT WOULD NOT HAVE A  
MAJORITY. BUT IF SYRIA ACCEPTS, THE CHANCES ARE GOOD THAT  
THE UN RESOLUTION WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE PLO.

8. AS FOR THE MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM OBJECTIVES OF ARAFAT'S  
INITIATIVE, THE NFAC ANALYST SAID U.S. RECOGNITION--OF SOME  
DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE PLO--IS MAXIMUM. WITHIN THE  
UN, RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION AND  
INDEPENDENT STATE IS MAXIMUM. RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHT  
TO SELF DETERMINATION IS MINIMUM. ANY WORDING MORE GENERAL  
THAN THIS WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR ARAFAT TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE  
AMONG THE PLO.

9. THE NFAC ANALYST SAID WE HAVE NOT SEEN MUCH REACTION  
AMONG THE PLO OR THE ARAB STATES IN REGARD TO THE UN INITIATIVE.  
THE BREAKDOWN, HOWEVER, WOULD BE LOGICAL: CONSERVATIVE STATES  
WOULD SEE IT AS BUILDING ON SOMETHING WORTHWHILE; BUT THERE  
WOULD BE A GREAT DEAL OF DEBATE OVER WORDING. IRAQ, WE WOULD  
IMAGINE, WOULD MAINTAIN ITS REJECTIONIST STANCE. AS FOR SYRIA  
THE WORDING WOULD BE CRUCIAL. IN EFFECT, THERE IS NO CHANCE

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OF IRAQI SUPPORT, BUT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF SYRIAN INITIATIVE. WE THINK THE SOVIET UNION HAS REACTED NEGATIVELY TOWARD ARAFAT'S INITIATIVES AT THE UN AND IN WESTERN EUROPE. THE SOVIETS WOULD FEAR THE PLO BEING DRAWN CLOSER TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE CREATION OF THE ARAB BLOC THAT OPPOSES CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. ARAFAT WOULD LIKE TO GET ENOUGH SUPPORT TO CONTINUE INITIATIVES WITHOUT RISKING AN OUTRIGHT SPLIT WITHIN PLO RANKS.

12. ALLON ASKED THE QUESTION OF WHO IS ARAFAT? AT THE UN, AND THE NFAC ANALYST SAID MOST LIKELY IT IS THE KUWAITIS SINCE THEY ARE ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ALLON ASKED IF THERE WERE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PLO AND EGYPT ON THIS. THE NFAC ANALYST ANSWERED WE WOULD SUSPECT SO AT LEAST IN THE FORM OF INFORMAL CONTACTS BUT THAT WE HONESTLY DON'T KNOW FOR THE TIME BEING THESE CONTACTS WENT.

IRAC-SYRIA

11. REGARDING RECENT EVENTS IN IRAQ, THE NFAC ANALYST SAID WE SEE THESE EVENTS AS A POLITICAL CONFRONTATION RATHER THAN AS A COUP PLOT. THESE EVENTS HAVE ALREADY HAD A COOLING EFFECT ON IRAQI-SYRIAN RELATIONS. ACCORDING TO OUR INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS, WE THINK THIS WILL BE SHORT TERM. A POLITICAL CONFRONTATION WOULD BE A DOMESTIC PROBLEM, AND SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT WOULD NOT BE A MAJOR ELEMENT. WHAT IS DIFFICULT TO DISCOVER IS IRAQI, AND SPECIFICALLY SADDAM HUSAYN'S PERCEPTION. UP TO LAST OCTOBER, EACH COUNTRY WAS IN CONTACT WITH AND SUPPORTING THE OPPOSITION GROUPS OF THE OTHER COUNTRY. OLD SUSPICIONS DID NOT DIE HARD, AND WE ASSUME HUSAYN SUSPECTS SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION GROUPS IN IRAQ. WE DO NOT BELIEVE ASSAD RECENTLY HAS BEEN ACTIVELY SUPPORTING IRAQI DISSIDENCE. OUR LACK OF SUCH EVIDENCE LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT SUCH IRAQI-SYRIAN SPONSORSHIP OF OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES AGAINST EACH OTHER CEASED WITH THE RAPPROCHMENT LAST FALL. THE REASONS THAT BROUGHT SYRIA AND IRAQ TOGETHER LAST FALL STILL EXIST, BUT THIS LAST INCIDENT INDICATES THE FRAGILITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP. THE RESIDUE OF PAST ANIMOSITY IS STILL THERE. AN OPEN BREAK BETWEEN THE TWO WILL NOT SERVE EITHER'S INTEREST, AND IRAQ

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SEEMS TO RECOGNIZE THIS BY REFUSING TO NAME THE FOREIGN ELEMENT EVEN THOUGH EVERYONE ASSUMES THE UNIDENTIFIED FOREIGN ELEMENT IS SYRIA.

12. THE NFAC ANALYST SAID IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS THE LONG-TERM IMPACT. AS FOR THE SHORT TERM, OUR ASSESSMENT IS: AS LONG AS SERIOUS TENSION BETWEEN THE TWO EXISTS IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO ORGANIZE ANOTHER ARAB SUMMIT. THEREFORE, CONCERTED ARAB ACTIONS FOR NEW MEASURES SUCH AS ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST EGYPT WILL BE UNLIKELY TO OCCUR. THERE IS AN ARAB CONSENSUS, HOWEVER, ON CURRENT SANCTIONS. THERE IS NOTHING TO STOP UNILATERAL EFFORTS TO MAKE ARAB MODERATES HOLD THE LINE, AND THESE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE THE SAME NET EFFECT CONCERTED PRESSURE.

13. IN THE MID-TERM, THE NFAC ANALYST SAID OUR TENTATIVE ASSESSMENT IS THAT RECENT EVENTS IN IRAQ WILL HAVE LITTLE OR NO EFFECT ON IRAQI INTER-ARAB POLICY. ALSO, EVENTS WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON SYRIA'S POLICY IN LEBANON AS THE REASONS FOR STAYING OR WITHDRAWING DO NOT DERIVE FROM RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. LIKewise WE FEEL EVENTS IN IRAQ WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON SYRIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS. EVEN THOUGH RELATIONS WITH IRAQ ARE IMPORTANT FOR SYRIA, THE QUESTION OF SYRIANS JOINING THE NEGOTIATIONS IS SO IMPORTANT THAT SYRIA WOULD ACT WHEN IT WAS RIGHT FOR SYRIA--REGARDLESS OF IRAQI OBJECTIVES.

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S E C R E T

SECRET 0209 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 5410

TO: IMMEDIATEBEIR DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL MJBARGE INTEL

REF: BEIRUT 54880

1. IN ADDITION TO REQUIREMENTS ALREADY FURNISHED, WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN AN MJBARGE/1 HAS OF GAN ACQUIRE ON THE SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY, ONE TWELVE OF WHOSE ALLEGED MEMBERS HAVE BEEN SENTENCED T DEATH IN AHVAZ. DOES THE PARTY HAVE ANY PALESTINIAN--P RHA S FLP--CONNECTIONS? WHAT ARE ITS CURRENT MEMBERSHIP, OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES?

2. WE HAVE HEARD THAT O OFFICE IN AHVAZ WAS CLOSED CIRCA MID-JULY. CAN B/1 CONFIR AN PROVIDE CIRCUMSTANCES OF CLOSURE? ANY CHANGE OFFICE WILL RE P N

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Note: This is a typed text of a shredded document which was reconstructed; the reason being its opacity which makes it unfit for printing purposes. Between-the-letters' space indicates that the shreds were either incomplete or they were fully un-intelligible.

53 SEP 79

SECRET 0209 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE BEIRUT 54263

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, LONDON.

WNINTEL INTEL PEEFFORT

1. PEEFFORT/1 HAS PASSED US INFORMATION WHICH HE OBTAINED FROM HANNA BUR F I D I OF PHALANGE PARTY G-2, CONCERNING THE TRAINING OF IRANIAN IN SOUTHERN LEBANON BY PALESTINIANS. ACCORDING TO HREIDI, A MESSENGER FROM MAJOR SAAD H A D A D, LEADER OF THE RIGHTIST MILITIAS IN SOUTH LEBANON, TOLD THE LEBANESE FRONT'S MILITARY COUNCIL ON 19 AUGUST THAT 150 IRANIAN WERE BEING TRAINED NEAR THE LITANI RIVER BY FATAH. THE IRANIAN WERE DESCRIBED ONLY AS BEING PRO-KHOMENI.

2. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY QUERIED MJBARGE/1, MJMARTYR/1 AND MJERIDGE/1 ABOUT PALESTINIAN TRAINING OF IRANIAN IN LEBANON. ALL THREE DENY THAT ANY SUCH TRAINING IS GOING ON. MJERIDGE/1 AND MJMARTYR/1 ARE CERTAINLY IN A POSITION TO BE KNOWLEDGABLY OF ANY FATAH TRAINING, AND THEY HAVE NOT YET SEEM RELUCTANT TO SUPPLY US WITH ANY INFORMATION ON IRAN, OR ON FATAH TRAINING OF OTHER GROUPS. MJERIDGE/1 TRAVELS TWICE A WEEK TO SOUTHERN LEBANON, AND HE SAYS THAT ALL TRAINING SITES IN THE SOUTH HAVE BEEN CLOSED BECAUSE OF THE ISRAELI SHELLING AND BOMBING CAMPAIGN THERE, WHICH HAS BEEN CONTINUAL SINCE APRIL. MJERIDGE/1 SAYS THAT IF ANY TRAINING OF IRANIAN IS GOING ON IT WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED IN SYRIA OR IN NORTHERN LEBANON (THE BIDA' VALLEY FOR INSTANCE) AS IT IS NOT CURRENTLY FEASIBLE IN THE SOUTH.

3. FRANKLY, WE DOUBT THAT PARA 1 INFORMATION IS TRIF.

4. PARA 1 MAY BE PASSED TO GNGRAPH.

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IRUT 54565

DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

TEL MJBARGE

- A. TEHRAN STAFF
- B. BEIRUT 54470
- C. DIRECTOR 475714

1. AT SEPTEMBER MEETING, MJMARTYR/1 INFORMED US THAT MJBARGE/1 WAS IN LIBYA REPRESENTING FAYAH AT A MEETING OF REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. BECAUSE OF THIS, WE COULD NOT OVER WITH MJBARGE/1 HIS WRITTEN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS. WE COULD NOT WASTE ANY MORE TIME IN THAT MJBARGE/1 WILL BE ABLE TO ELABORATE ON HIS ANSWERS. WE FORWARDING HIS RESPONSES BY OPS CABLE LATER TODAY.

2. AT MEETING, MJMARTYR/1 ALSO PASSED ON ADDITIONAL WRITTEN REPORTS ON EVENTS IN IRAN WHICH MJBARGE/1 HAD PREPARED PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR LIBYA. WE ARE PASSING THESE IN OPS FORMAT.

3. MJMARTYR/1 SAYS THAT MJBARGE/1 STILL EXPECTS TO TRAVEL TO IRAN UPON HIS RETURN FROM LIBYA. WE PASSED ON REQUEST IN REF A FOR MJMARTYR/1 TO GIVE TO MJBARGE/1.

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SECRET 51234Z SEP 79 STAFF

IRUT 54565

DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN

INITIAL INFO MJBARGE

- REF: A. DIRECTOR 475714
- B. BEIRUT 54483
- C. BEIRUT 54565

THE FOLLOWING IS MJMARTYR/1'S (1/1) WRITTEN RESPONSE TO ONE OF THE QUESTIONS POSED IN REF.

1. POLITICAL DYNAMICS:

A. DECISIONS IN IRAN ARE MADE BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH AYATOLLAH MONTAZARI AND OTHER AYATOLLAS IN KHOMEINI'S INNER CIRCLE, KHOMEINI IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE SPIRITUAL FATHER OF THE STATE. AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND THE STATE IS FOR THE STATE TO IMPLEMENT DECISIONS WHICH KHOMEINI HAS MADE. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IS DIRECTLY UNDER KHOMEINI IN AUTHORITY AND PARTICIPATES IN THE DECISION MAKING. THE STATE DOES NOT HAVE DECISION-MAKING POWER; IT ONLY EXISTS TO IMPLEMENT THE DECISIONS MADE BY KHOMEINI AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN IS COMPLICATED AT TIMES, BECAUSE OF DISAGREEMENTS ON SOME POINTS, AND IS GOOD AT OTHER TIMES. IN GENERAL, THE RELATIONSHIP COULD BE DESCRIBED AS "NOT BAD". THE POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND BAZARGAN ARE:

- (1) THE INTERVENTION OF THE "RELIGIOUS KEY" IN ALL MATTERS LARGE AND SMALL.
- (2) BAZARGAN'S OPPOSITION TO THE EXECUTIONS, WHICH ARE THE RESULT OF CONTINUED PROSECUTIONS BY THE "RELIGIOUS KEY".



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(3) THE PRACTICES (MFI) OF ELEMENTS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS.

(4) KHOMEINI'S INSISTENCE THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS ARE THE ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY.

(5) KHOMEINI'S PRO-PALESTINIAN STANCE, HIS ATTITUDE TO THE MIDDLE EAST, AND HIS STAND ON EGYPT.

(6) THE SITUATION IN THE ARMY AND THE REORGANIZING OF BAZARGAN HAS ONE OPINION AND KHOMEINI ANOTHER.

(7) THE SEVERE DECISIONS MADE BY KHOMEINI, WHICH BAZARGAN CONSIDERS, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, REACTIONARY.

C. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS ITS HEADQUARTERS AT QUM, BUT THE CENTER OF ITS ACTIVITY IS IN TEHRAN. IT HAS A PRESENCE IN ALL REGIONS IN IRAN. IT IS COMPOSED OF AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF PERSONS, BUT A NUMBER SUFFICIENT TO COVER ALL THE REGIONS. IT IS HEADED BY KHOMEINI. OTHER RANKING MEMBERS ARE: AYATOLLAH MONTAZARI, AYATOLLAH (? AL-TAYS ?), AHMAD AL-KHOMEINI, AYATOLLAH KHALIL, ESHRAFI (PROBABLY ESHRAFI), COLONEL (AID) NAMTU, AND AHMAD MONTAZARI, AND OTHERS WHOSE NAMES ARE NOT KNOWN. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEETS AS NECESSARY. ONE MEETING A MONTH IS HELD WITH KHOMEINI PRESENT.

### 3. KHOMEINI:

A. KHOMEINI'S PERMANENT BASE IS IN QUM. HE IS USUALLY FOUND IN THE SCHOOL (MADRASAH). HE IS WELL GUARDED, AND HIS GUARDS ARE WELL TRAINED. A LARGE PORTION OF THESE GUARDS ARE FORMER AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. THERE IS A BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATION, A SECURITY OFFICE AND A COMPLAINTS OFFICE.

B. KHOMEINI IS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS SON AHMAD AT ALL TIMES. OTHER PERSONS USUALLY WITH KHOMEINI ARE: MALUKUNI (SIC), MONTAZARI, BEHESHTI, AND ESHRAFI (ESHRAFI ?). THERE ARE ALSO OTHERS WITH HIM.

C. THE FEDAYEN-E-ISLAM ARE A VERY EXTREMIST SECT. KHOMEINI HAS A VERY STRONG RELATIONSHIP TO THEM, AND COULD BE THEIR

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LEADER. THEIR AIM IS TO LIQUIDATE EVERY ONE WHO HAD WORKED WITH THE SHAH, AND TO INSIST ON GETTING KHOMEINI TO MAKE MORE POSITIVE DECISIONS. THEIR NUMBER IS NOT LARGE.

D. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND SHARIAT-MADARI IS NOT GOOD. THEY DIFFER A LOT IN THEIR VIEWPOINTS.

E. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND MARASHI-NAJAFI IS NOT BAD.

F. EVERY AYATOLLAH HAS HIS OWN BASE, WHERE HE RESIDES, AND HIS OWN MADRASAH (SCHOOL). HIS OWN PUPILS, SUPPORTERS AND OPINIONS. EACH HAS HIS OWN PERSONAL GUARDS. THERE IS HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE VARIOUS GROUPS OF GUARDS, BUT IT IS WELL HIDDEN AND NOT READILY APPARENT.

G. KHOMEINI SETS OFFICIAL DELEGATIONS AND OFFICIAL VISITORS IN SMALL MEETINGS. HOWEVER, PRIOR APPROVAL MUST BE OBTAINED AND AN APPOINTMENT MADE.

H. KHOMEINI'S HEALTH IS "NOT BAD". HE IS 74 YEARS OLD.

I. IF KHOMEINI WERE TO SUDDENLY DIE, IT WOULD BE A STRONG SHOCK TO THE PEOPLE AND TO THE REVOLUTION. HE WOULD, HOWEVER, NOT BE SUCCEEDED BY ANY ONE PERSON. THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL WOULD TAKE OVER FOR KHOMEINI, AND THE REVOLUTION WOULD CONTINUE IN ITS PRESENT COURSE. THOSE WHO WOULD PLAY THE PRINCIPAL ROLE WOULD BE: AYATOLLAH MONTAZARI, AYATOLLAH KHALIL, AHMAD AL-KHOMEINI, KHALIL, AND ESHRAFI (ESHRAFI ?).

J. THE BASE (SIC) OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS IS IN QUM. THEY ARE TRAINED BY FORMER MEMBERS OF THE IRANIAN ARMY FORCES.

### 4. OPPOSITION TO KHOMEINI:

A. SHARIAT-MADARI IS VERY CLOSE TO BAZARGAN AND IS DISTANT FROM KHOMEINI. SHARIAT-MADARI IS AN ASTUTE POLITICIAN, AND A MAN OF LAW AND THEOLOGY. THERE IS NOT BIG DANGER TO THE GOVERNMENT FROM SHARIAT-MADARI BECAUSE HE FEARS CONFRONTATION. HE DOES NOT LIKE ADVENTURE (SIC) AND IS NOT RACIST.

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 E. TALEGHANI IS NOT A LEFTIST, BUT HE IS SYMPATHETIC TO THE LEFT. HIS CHILDREN ARE MEMBERS OF LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS. HE LEFT IS EXPLOITING THE STANDS OF TALEGHANI.

C. THERE ARE MOVEMENTS AROUND THE PAZARI LEADERSHIP (NFI), BUT THEY ALL CONVERGE INTO KHOMEINI'S POSITIONS.

D. ACTIVITIES AND DESIGNS AGAINST THE REVOLUTION DO NOT GO BEYOND DEMONSTRATIONS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF TRACTS, AND SOME OCCASIONAL ASSASSINATIONS.

E. THE IRANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (TUDER) IS MAKING NUMEROUS AND COMPLICATED EFFORTS. THEY ARE INFILTRATING TUDER PERSONNEL INTO ALL LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS AS WELL AS INTO THE RANKS OF THE WORKERS AND STUDENTS. THEY ARE ALSO INFILTRATING INTO THE MINORITIES, ESPECIALLY THE KURDS AND THE ARABS, AND INTO THE RANKS OF THE ARMY, WHERE THEY ARE CONCENTRATING ON SOILING DISCONTENT AMONG ARMY RECRUITING OFFICERS AND NCO'S. TUDER IS RELYING ITSELF WITH ALL LEFTIST GROUPS. WHEREVER THE OPPORTUNITY ARISES, TUDER'S ATTITUDES AND AIMS ARE MANY. THE MOST IMPORTANT BEING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION TO A POINT WHERE IRAN OPENLY STANDS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL LEFT AND THE SOVIET UNION. TUDER MEMBERS ARE BEING TRAINED ON ALL TYPES OF WEAPONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE FROM THE EASTERN BLOC. AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF TUDER MEMBERS ARE TRAINING OUTSIDE IRAN IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THEY MAINTAIN SECRET COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE PARTY IN IRAN THROUGH EMBASSIES IN TEHRAN AND ACROSS THE IRAQI AND AFGHANISTAN BORDERS.

##### 5. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES:

A. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES ARE THE BRIDGING CONNECTION BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND THE PEOPLE. THE COMMITTEES CONTROL AND DIRECT THE SECURITY AFFAIRS IN IRAN AND HELP TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF THE PEOPLE.

B. THERE IS NO HIERARCHY OF COMMITTEES. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT COMMITTEES IS A MATTER OF COORDINATION. EACH COMMITTEE IS TIED TO THE PRINCIPAL COMMITTEE IN TEHRAN, THROUGH WHICH ALL THE COMMITTEES ARE TIED TO QUM.

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 C. PART OF EACH COMMITTEE IS MADE UP OF FULL TIME MEMBERS. THESE RECEIVE A MONTHLY SALARY. ALL THE COMMITTEE MEMBERS ARE TIED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN TEHRAN, AND THROUGH IT THEY CAN COMMUNICATE WITH KHOMEINI AFTER GOING THROUGH THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. ALL THE EXISTING REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES ARE ULTIMATELY LINKED WITH KHOMEINI.

D. KHOMEINI, DESPITE MANY UNPOPULAR DECISIONS, STILL REMAINS THE STRONGEST FACTOR INFLUENCING THE IRANIAN MASSES. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMMITTEES ARE SUPERFICIAL AND DO NOT REACH FUNDAMENTAL LEVELS. IN SPITE OF THE PRACTICES (NFI) OF SOME INDIVIDUALS TO STIR UP TROUBLES, THESE INDIVIDUALS INCLUDE FORMER AGENTS OF THE IRAN OF THE LEFT, AND THEY EXAGGERATE THE SIZE OF MISTAKES AND EXPLORE PROBLEMS IN ORDER TO CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THE REVOLUTION. (COMMENT: THE BANNING OF DEMONSTRATIONS IS A PRELIMINARY STEP TOWARD THE DOMESTICATION (SIC) OF THE LEFT IN IRAN.)

6. DEFER TO HEADQUARTERS FOR ANY DISSEMINATION.

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CITE BEIRUT 51567

TO: DIRECTOR INFO THERAN

WMINTL INTEL MJBARGE

REF: BEIRUT 54565

1. MJMARTYR/1 PASSED US THE FOLLOWING WRITTEN REPORT FROM MJBARGE/1 ON IRAN IN LATE AUGUST.

2. FOLLOWING THE RECENT ELECTIONS AND THE TRIUMPH OF THE PRO-KHOMEINI CANDIDATES, THE OPPOSITION FORCES, REPRESENTED BY THE LEFT, THE TUDER PARTY, SOME MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENTIA AND THE PRO-SHARIAT-MADARI ELEMENTS (WHICH ARE BACKED BY SOME POLITICIANS, INCLUDING BAZARGAN WHO HAS YET TO TAKE AN OPEN STAND) MADE VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN IRAN. THE FORCES WHICH MANIPULATED THESE DEMONSTRATIONS ALSO COORDINATED WITH THE TUDER AND URGED THEM TO MOVE. THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS TO STRAIN THE AUTHORITY AND TO WEAKEN IT, PARTICULARLY KHOMEINI, WHO IS STILL CONSIDERED TO BE THE DOMINANT FORCE IN IRAN.

3. AS A RESULT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS, KHOMEINI MOVED QUICKLY AND ORDERED THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS TO CONFRONT THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE KURDS. THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS THEN ATTACKED THE OFFICES OF THE LEFT IN TEHRAN, WHICH ARE CONSIDERED TO BE THE PRIMARY CENTERS OF DISSENT AGAINST THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. IN THESE OFFICES, THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CONFISCATED TRACTS, PRINTING PRESSES AND WEAPONS. ORDERS WERE THEN ISSUED FORBIDDING DEMONSTRATIONS AND INSTRUCTING THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS TO CONFRONT ANY DEMONSTRATIONS WITH VIOLENCE.

4. KHOMEINI ALSO INSTRUCTED THE ARMY TO LIQUIDATE THE KURD REBELLION AT ANY PRICE. THE BORDERS WITH IRAQ WERE CLOSED TO PREVENT ANYONE FLEEING IRAQ FROM ENTERING THAT COUNTRY, AS WELL AS TO PREVENT ARMS FROM BEING SMUGGLED TO THE KURDS BY IRAQI AGENTS.

5. FATAH'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN IS THAT

PAGE 2 BEIRUT 54567 SECRET  
KHOMEINI REMAINS THE STRONGEST FACTOR IN IRAN, AND THAT HE CRUSH THE REBELLION, AS WELL AS THE LEFT IF IT PERSISTS IN BEING A CAUSE OF ANNOYANCE TO HIM. FATAH ALSO BELIEVES THAT KHOMEINI WILL CALL UPON THE SHIAH POPULATION OF IRAQ TO MOVE AGAINST THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IF IRAQ PERSISTS IN BACKING THE KURDS. THE REBELLION IN SANANDAJ WILL ALSO BE CRUSHED. WHO IS FEARFUL OF MOVES BY THE ARAB MINORITY IN ARABISTAN, BUT FATAH ESTIMATES THAT KHOMEINI STILL ENJOYS MOST POPULARITY WITH THE MASSES WHICH WILL ENABLE HIM TO STAND AGAINST ALL PLOTS AND EVENTS.

6. AT THE SAME TIME HE PASSED US THE REPORT CONTAINING PAR 2-3, MJMARTYR/1 ALSO PASSED US ANOTHER WRITTEN REPORT CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING TID-BITS ON IRAN:

A. A NEW ORGANIZATION NAMED ASHAR YAWAD 17 TAL ZA'HER HAS BEEN FORMED BY ELEMENTS THAT WERE FORMERLY IN AN IRANIAN REJECTION FRONT WHICH LATER JOINED WITH TUDER. IT IS THE ORGANIZATION WHICH CARRIES OUT TERRORIST OPERATIONS, VIOLENCE, ASSASSINATIONS, AND WHICH LATELY TRIED TO MURDER THE REVOLUTIONARY PUBLIC ATTORNEY.

B. THERE IS WRATH AND CONDEMNATION BY THE MEN OF THE PRESS BY THE PUBLISHERS AGAINST THE REVOLUTIONARY PUBLIC ATTORNEY "HAJATOLISLAM" ALI K A D U S, WHO IS CLOSING THE NEWSPAPERS AND THE MAGAZINES. HE WILL PROBABLY BE ASSASSINATED.

C. THE EDUCATED CLASS IS PRO-SHARIAT-MADARI. THEY ALSO FAVOR BAKHTAR. THIS GROUP, HOWEVER, WILL NOT TAKE ANY POSITIVE ACTION, RATHER IT WILL REMAIN PASSIVE. IT IS HEADED BY SHARIAT-MADARI, WHO DOES NOT BELIEVE IN VIOLENCE AS A WAY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS.

D. THE COMMANDER OF THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAS BEEN RECENTLY REPLACED BY A PRO-KHOMEINI GENERAL. (NYI).

E. MANY ELEMENTS FROM AFGHANISTAN ARE BEING TRAINED IN KIZVIN, NORTH OF TEHRAN, BY CADRES AND EXPERTS FROM THE IRANIAN ARMY WHO WERE FORMERLY IN THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION. THESE EXPERTS INCLUDE GURYERA, ABU SHARAF, ABU AL-QASIM AND

PAGE 3 BEIRUT 54567 S E C R E T  
OTHERS.

F. ALEC, IN ALL THE REGIONS OF IRAN. JUNIOR OFFICERS OF THE IRANIAN ARMY ARE TRAINING ELEMENTS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS. ONLY A SMALL NUMBER OF PALESTINIAN INSTRUCTORS REMAIN IN IRAN. BUT, MJEAR3E/1 THINKS THEIR NUMBER WILL INCREASE SOON.

G. THE SITUATION IN AHMAZ IS NOT STABLE AND COULD WORSE. THIS COMMENT WAS MADE BY MAJOR MUSAMMAD T H A B I T, THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE PLQ OFFICE IN AHMAZ.

H. DEFER TO HEADQUARTERS FOR ANY DISSEMINATION.

I. INFO PLABIT.

J. FILE: DEFER. RVAS 5 SEP 80 DRV EDC.1 ALL SECAM  
S E C R E T

BT  
#4567

620115 1 062

S E C R E T 060855Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE BEIRUT 54572

TO: DIRECTOR INFO THERAN.

UNINTL, INTL MJBARGE

REF: BEIRUT 54565

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF THE REPORT ON IRAN FROM MJBARGE/1 WHICH WAS PASSED TO US ON 3 SEPTEMBER.

2. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO KATAM, IRAQ IS SUPPORTING THE KURDISH REBELS IN KURDISTAN IN THE LATTER FIGHT TO GAIN AUTONOMY. NOT ONLY IS SADDAM MUSAYN DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SUPERVISING THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS, BUT IRAQ HAS RELEASED (SIC) HIGH RANK AND OTHER OFFICERS AND ASSIGNED THEM TO WORK WITH THE KURDISH REBELS. ALSO JUNIOR OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO LEAD THE KURDISH TROOPS.

3. AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH AL-KHOMAYNI HAS SENT OUT A GENERAL CALL TO CRUSH THE REBELS, AND THE IRANIAN ARMY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS ENTERED MOST OF THE KURDISH AREA. TIGHTENING THE ROPE AROUND THE NECK OF THE KURDS. A GREAT NUMBER OF KURDS WERE KILLED AND WOUNDED AND THERE WERE NUMEROUS EXECUTIONS. THE REMAINDER OF THE REBELS HAVE FLED TO THE MOUNTAINS AND OTHER DIFFICULT TO GET TO AREAS FROM WHICH THEY WILL HAVE A GUERRILLA WAR BACKED BY IRAQ.

4. IN ORDER TO SAVE THE REST OF THE KURDS, SOME OF THEIR "MIRI MEN" AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS CONTACTED AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, WHO, IN TURN, CONTACTED KHOMEINI. AS A RESULT OF THESE CONTACTS, A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF HIGH-LEVEL PERSONAGES WHO ARE CLOSE TO KHOMEINI WAS DISPATCHED TO THE AREA OF THE FIGHTING. THIS COMMITTEE WAS ABLE TO CALM CONDITIONS IN THE AREA WITH THE PROMISE THAT KURDISH CLAIMS WILL BE REVIEWED PROMPTLY AFTER ALL FIGHTING HAS FULLY CEASED.

PAGE 2 BEIRUT 54572 SECRET

THE AYATOLLAH MONTAZARI, KHALKHALI, TAJMABANI (SIC), AND ESHRAFI (SIC) PLAYED A PRINCIPLE ROLE IN CALMING THE SITUATION IN KURDISTAN. HOWEVER, KHOMEINI REAFFIRMED (BY HIS ACTIONS) THAT HE IS THE STRONGEST MAN IN IRAN AND THE PRINCIPLE LEADER. HE ALONE CAN PLAY WITH ALL THE CARDS WITHOUT FEAR (SIC).

6. BUT THE LEFTIST FORCES LED BY TUDEN AND THE FEDAYEEN KHALQI IRAN ARE SENTING IN ORDER THEIR MILITARY AND ORGANIZATIONAL AFFAIRS. THIS IS BEING DONE IN SECRET, AND THEY ARE NOW GOING UNDERGROUND FOR FEAR OF BEING HIT AND LIQUIDATED BY KHOMEINI.

7. THERE ARE MANY CHANGES (NFI) THAT WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE ARMY AND ON THE CIVIL AND GOVERNMENTAL LEVELS. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND EXPECTS SOME PROBLEMS IN ARABISTAN AND BELIEVES THAT IRAQ WILL ALSO BE "NOURISHING" THESE EVENTS. HOWEVER, THE SITUATION IN IRAN STILL REQUIRES WORK BASED ON A STUDY OF THE SITUATION AND CAREFUL PROGRAMMING FOR THE FUTURE BECAUSE THINGS ARE STILL SHROUDED WITH VAGUENESS.

8. THE SITUATION OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) IN IRAN IS VERY GOOD, AND RELATIONS WITH THE COMMAND IN QOM ARE VERY STRONG. THE LAST LETTER (NFI) FROM (PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN YASIR) ARAFAT TO KHOMEINI HAD A VERY GOOD EFFECT AND HELPED TO CALM THE SITUATION IN KURDISTAN. THE MEETING OF THE PLO'S REPRESENTATIVE WITH TALEGHANI AND THEN WITH KHOMEINI HELPED A GREAT DEAL TO HALT THE FIGHTING AND WAS MET WITH SATISFACTION FROM THE KURDISH SIDE. THEREFORE THE PLO IS ABLE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE CURRENT EVENTS IN IRAN AND IS ABLE TO MAKE FAIL (SIC) THE PLOTS OF THE PLOTTE WHO CONSTANTLY WORK TO STRIKE THE IRANIAN AND PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION.

9. ALSO, FATAH HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

A. SHARIAT-MADARI IS CONDUCTING INTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH ALL THE FORCES WHICH ARE INVOLVED WITH THE EVENTS AND WHICH ARE NOT WITH KHOMEINI.

B. (FORMER PRIME MINISTER) BAKHTIAR IS IN CONTACT WITH

PAGE 3 BEIRUT 54572 SECRET

SHARIAT-MADARI AND THEY ARE COORDINATING THEIR ACTIONS. THEY ALSO COMMUNICATE WITH SOME ARMY ELEMENTS (NFI). FATAH, HOWEVER, ESTIMATES THAT KHOMEINI KNOWS ABOUT "THESE THINGS" (A AND B), AND SHALL CRUSH THEM BEFORE THEY MOVE. FATAH BELIEVES THIS BECAUSE IN TALKING TO FATAH REPRESENTATIVES (NFI) IN MID-AUGUST KHALKHALI SAID, "WE SHALL FINISH WITH THE KURDS BUT OTHER PROBLEMS WILL EMERGE. THIS HAS BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, AND WE SHALL CRUSH ANY CONSPIRACY AND EVERY CONSPIRATOR WHEN HE WAS ASKED ABOUT BAKHTIAR'S RENEWED ACTIVITY, KHALKHALI SAID THAT BAKHTIAR, "ONLY POSSESSES HIS TONGUE, AND HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO ANYTHING BECAUSE THE MAJORITY OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE ARE WITH THE REVOLUTION".

10. DEFER TO DIRECTOR FOR ANY DISSEMINATION.

11. FILE: DEFER. RVW 6 SEP 69 DRV D9C, 1 ALL SECRET  
SECRET



SECRET 110700Z SEP 79 STAFF

CIT BEIRUT 54606

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, TRIPOLI.

UNITEL INTEL MJBARGE

1. IN VERY BRIEF CAR MEETING WITH MJBARGE/1 (M/1) NIGHT OF 10 SEPTEMBER, B/1 TOLD US THAT HE WILL LEAVE FOR TEHRAN ON 12 SEPTEMBER. HE EXPECTS TO RETURN TO BEIRUT IN EARLY OCTOBER. BEFORE RETURNING TO BEIRUT, B/1 WILL TRAVEL TO PDY AND SPAIN.

2. B/1 HAD JUST RETURNED FROM LIBYA. WHILE THERE HE SAID HE WAS STRUCK BY THE AMOUNT OF ADVANCED WEAPONRY HE SAW. HE SAYS HE PERSONALLY SAW NINE MIG-27'S, AS WELL AS NUMEROUS MIG-23'S AND 23'S, PLUS MISSILES (MFI) AND LARGE AMOUNTS OF T-72 TANKS. ADDITIONALLY, B/1 WAS AMAZED AT THE AMOUNT OF CUBANS HE SAW IN LIBYA. WHEN PRESSED FOR A NUMBER HE COULD ONLY SAY, "MANY, MANY." HE SAID THAT THERE WERE BOTH ADVISORS AND CUBAN MILITARY UNITS PRESENT. THE CUBANS ARE HEAVILY INVOLVED IN TRAINING AFRICANS IN LIBYA. B/1 SAYS THAT HE WAS TOLD BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE LIBYAN ARMED FORCES THAT 30,000 AFRICANS WERE IN LIBYA UNDERGOING MILITARY TRAINING. THESE INCLUDED PERSONS FROM UGANDA, CHAD, ZIMBABWE, SPANISH SAHARA, AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE. B/1 SAID.

3. B/1 ALSO TOLD US THAT FATAH NOW HAS 25 IRANIANS IN LEPANON BEING TRAINED AT THE BURJ AL-BARAJNAH COMMANDO TRAINING FACILITY. THESE IRANIANS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY KHOMEINI'S COMPANION (RAFIQ) UN-UNTIAZAR (NOT RELATED TO THE AYATOLLAH OF THE SAME NAME.) UNTIAZAR, WHO ACCORDING TO B/1 WAS IN PARIS WITH KHOMEINI AND VERY CLOSE TO THE AYATOLLAH, TOLD B/1 THAT KHOMEINI HAS DECIDED THAT PRIME MINISTER BAZ ARGAN WILL HAVE TO GO. WE HAVE NO MORE DETAILS AT THIS POINT.

4. FILE: 261-946977. RVW 11 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET  
SECRET

11 Sep 79 19 50Z

11 SEP 79 19 50Z

E 110700Z SEP 79 STAFF

RU 54602

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

MJBARGE/1 M/1

UNIT 4602

UNIT 4602 INFORMED US EVENING 11 SEPTEMBER THAT B/1 WOULD LEAVE FOR TEHRAN ON 12 SEPTEMBER. MJBARGE/1 ACCOMPANIED BY BRIGADIER SAID S A Y L (ABU WALAD). FATAH'S MILITARY OPERATIONS ROOM. THEY SHOULD REMAIN A WEEK TO TEN DAYS.

UNIT 4602 ALSO PASSED US WRITTEN REQUESTS FROM MJBARGE/1 AND B/1 TO LIBYA AND ON IRAN. WE ARE HAVING THESE REQUESTS REVIEWED.

FILE: 261-946977. RVW 12 SEP 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET  
SECRET

1. WILL DO OUR BEST TO PROVIDE MORE PRECISE IDENTIFICATION OF "MUMTAZAR". HOWEVER, CASE OFFICER WHO OBTAINED INFO FROM MJBARGE/L (B/D) WILL BE ABSENT FROM STATION UNTIL CA. 1300 DURING THIS PERIOD. WE MAY NOT HAVE AN PERSONAL MEETINGS WITH B/D DEPENDING UPON SEVERAL FACTORS, INCLUDING B/D'S RELUCTANCE TO MEET WITH A TTY. OVO DURING THIS MONTH, OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR B/D WILL BE PASSED IN WRITING VIA MJBARTYR. NEXT MEETING WITH MJBARTYR IS SCHEDULED FOR 24 SEP. WILL ADVISE.

2. NO FILE: R/V 28 SEP 89 DRV D9.1 ALL SECRET  
SECRET

HE BROKE (C) RETURNED FROM HIS LATEST VISIT  
IN RESPONSE TO  
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON "MURDER"  
WITH A REPORT WHICH IS BEING  
PEASANTS WILL FIND FOLLOWING  
ID VERIFYING THIS ELUSIVE CHARACTER

NOT FRANK RICHMOND MONTZARI WAS  
 HAD THE SON OF ANATOLIAN MONTZARI  
 IS NOT KNOWN AS MONTZARI. HE  
 PART OF THE CITY. HE IS POOR AND  
 WAS CALLED THERE THAN QUCE DURING THE  
 WORD FIGHT. BELIEVER AND IS CALLED  
 KNOWN IN THE ARABIAN VOLUNTARI  
 IS IN THE. WITH MONTZARI  
 AND OTHER WITH MONTZARI IS IN  
 ONE OF THE PARTS OF THE REVOLUTION  
 HIS FATHER. ACTIVELY IN THE  
 FATHER HAS DIED AND OTHER LIVES IN  
 AND SAID. HIS ONLY THE  
 CAUSE. RECENTLY HE WENT TO  
 (MONTZARI) MONTZARI HAS BEEN OUT  
 WITH THE NO EFFECT

FILE DEFER IS OUT SS-DRY

11 OCT 79

S E C R E T 101730Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE BEIRUT 54836

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL INTEL SDVALID

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 528725  
B. TEHRAN 54407

1. IF ESFAHANI OF REFS HAS ARRIVED LEBANON SINCE 1 OCT HE HAS KEPT VERY LOW PROFILE. TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE THERE HAS BEEN NO PRESS COVERAGE OF HIS GREAT EMINENCE. QUERIED MJBRIIDGE/1 AT 10 OCT MEETING AND HE HAD NOT HEARD OF ESFAHANI. MJBRIIDGE/1 WILL CHECK TO ENSURE WE NOT MISSING OUT ON VISIT.

2. THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE PRESS COVERAGE FOR VISIT OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER DR. SADEQ TABATABA'I, WHO ARRIVED IN LEBANON ON 7 OCT AND DEPARTED ON 9 OCT. WE HAVE TASKED APPROPRIATE ASSETS TO REPORT ANY SIGNIFICANT NON-PUBLIC DEVELOPMENTS RE THIS VISIT, AND WE'LL PROVIDE RESULTS TO ADDRES IF OBTAINED.

3. PLS ADVISE IF SUMMARY OF TABATABA'I'S PUBLIC ACTIVITIES HERE WOULD BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE.

4. NO FILE. RVW 10 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.  
S E C R E T

WHAT STATION CONSIDERED  
WHENEVER POSSIBLE IT BE SENT  
CONSIDERABLE DELAY IN DISSEMINATING  
AND ALL TOO OFTEN IT ULTIMATELY IS NOT DISSEMINATED  
THE COMMUNITY BUT IS SIMPLY RELEASED TO NFAC FOR FACTS  
SUGGEST STATION CONTINUE TO ZRWAHOO ALL B/1 REPORTS FOR HEADQUARTERS  
REVIEW OF OTHER COUNTRY CONTENT.

2. HAVE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON REF:

RE PARA SIX: ALTHOUGH THE PCOI HAS MADE CLEAR ITS INTENTION OF SPREADING THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY PRINCIPLES AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE, AND ALTHOUGH LIBYAN LEADER MU'AMMAR QADHAFI IS ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN THE PROPAGATION OF ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY, NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM THE ALLEGATION THAT LIBYA AND IRAN HAVE ENTERED INTO A "BINDING COOPERATION" TO SPREAD MUSLIM IDEAS, NOR CAN WE VERIFY THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WAS THE PURPOSE OF MOHAMMAD MONIAZZI'S EARLY JULY 1979 VISIT TO LIBYA. IN FACT, ACCORDING TO TRIPOLI EMBTEL 1277 DATED 5 JULY 1979, "MONIAZZI TALKED AT LENGTH, BUT SAID LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE".

RE PARA NINE: WE KEEP HEARING RUMORS OF THE IRANIAN ARMY



WHOSE NAME APPEARS TO BE

3. INFORMATION ON IRANIAN SCENE  
OCR WAS ESPECIALLY APPRECIATIVE FOR THE INFORMATION  
CHAMPAM. ANY ADDITIONAL BIO ON HIM WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

4. WITH B/1'S ESTABLISHED ACCESS TO SENIOR RELIGIOUS FIGURES  
INCLUDING AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, SUGGEST STATION SELECT APPROPRIATE  
REQUIREMENTS FROM FOLLOWING, WHICH UPDATED BY NFAC:

A. WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN  
KHOMEINI AND SHARIAT-MADARI? WILL SHARIAT-MADARI MORE  
ACTIVELY SUPPORT A MODERATE OPPOSITION GROUP NOW THAT  
ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION APPEARS TO INSTITUTIONALIZE  
CLERICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE GOVERNMENT? WITH WHOM IN THE  
MOSLEM PEOPLES ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY DOES SHARIAT-MADARI  
WORK? IS SHARIAT-MADARI IN CONTACT WITH BAKHTIAR? IF  
DOES HE THINK OF BAKHTIAR'S ACTIVITIES?

B. WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF TALABANI'S DEATH ON THE  
CLERICAL COMMUNITY? ARE THERE MORE OPEN CONFLICTS NOW  
BETWEEN THE SENIOR QOM AYATOLLAHS (SHARIAT-MADARI,  
GOLPAYGANI, MARASHI-NAJAFI) AND KHOMEINI'S CAMP? WHAT HAS

FOLLOWERS NOW INTEND TO  
NEW ISLAMIC REPUBLIC BY PASSING  
ARE IN THE MAJORITY IN GOVERNMENT  
POSITIONS SUCH AS THE MAJLES AND THE PRESIDENT  
THEY DETERMINED TO FORCE THE MORE SECULAR, MODERATE  
PRAGMATISTS (LIKE NAZIE) OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND RUN THEM  
THEMSELVES? IF SO, HOW DO THE SENIOR CLERICAL LEADERS SUCH  
AS SHARIAT-MADARI PLAN TO RESPOND?

C. WHAT KIND OF PRESSURE HAS KHOMEINI PUT ON CLERICAL  
LEADERS? WHAT, FOR EXAMPLE, ACCOUNTS FOR THE  
CHANGE IN TALABANI'S POSITION BEFORE HIS DEATH?

D. IS KHOMEINI DELIBERATELY TRYING TO CONVINCE PEOPLE  
THAT HE IS THE 1444 ZAMAN?

E. REQUEST STATION RESUBMIT REF A IN INTEL FORMAT, WITH  
ANY CLARIFICATION/AMPLIFICATION MJMARTYR/1 AELS PROVIDE A" 13 OCT-  
TOBE: MEETING.

F. FILE 221-346027. 44W 12OCT89 DRW DRC.1 ALL SECRET.  
S E C R E T  
FI  
#7325

25 OCT 79 07 54Z

SECRET 250643Z OCT 79 INTEL

CITE BEIRUT 54965 ZNY XXXX

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL INTEL MJBARGE

SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO FOR APPROVAL OF OMISSION OF PLACE ACQUIRED,  
AND APPROVAL OF SOURCE DESCRIPTION. OPACT: ARBLEAT.  
SOURCE: MJBARGE/1. SEE BEIRUT 54954 WHICH DOES NOT  
AFFECT DISSEM. (UNILATERAL). DAMASCO OBTAINED  
OD: D-1 NO LIAISON. NO INDEX: DEFER TO DIRECTOR FOR  
MILITARY DISSEM.  
CL BY: 03846A. FIELD NO.: NLB-18,692. FILE: DEFER.

FILED: 250643Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NO CONTRACT--ORCON  
EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED IN FINAL PARAGRAPH

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI ON TRANSFER  
OF ADVANCED WEAPONS SYSTEMS FROM IRAN TO ARAB COUNTRIES  
(DOI: LATE SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE: AN ARAB MILITARY OFFICER WHOSE PAST REPORTING ON  
OTHER AREAS HAS OFTEN BEEN SUBSTANTIATED.  
HE HAD ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION REPORTED.

1. IN LATE SEPTEMBER, SUBSEQUENT TO THE 24 SEPTEMBER AIR  
BATTLE OVER LEBANON BETWEEN SYRIAN AND ISRAELI AIRCRAFT, IRANIAN  
RELIGIOUS LEADER AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI COMMENTED  
ON THE POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF ADVANCED AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING THE U.S.  
MANUFACTURED F-14S AND F-16S, FROM IRAN TO SYRIA OR OTHER ARAB  
COUNTRIES CONFRONTING ISRAEL. KHOMEINI SAID THAT THE TRANSFER  
OF SUCH AIRCRAFT COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED SO LONG AS THE KURDISH  
PROBLEM CONTINUED IN IRAN, BECAUSE IRAN ITSELF NEEDED THE AIRCRAFT.  
KHOMEINI ADDED THAT ONCE THE KURDISH PROBLEM WAS DISPOSED WITH,  
HOWEVER, THEN HE WOULD "THINK ABOUT" SUCH A TRANSFER OF AIRCRAFT.  
KHOMEINI ALSO SAID THAT IF THE AIRCRAFT WERE TRANSFERRED, THE  
MOVE WOULD ALSO INCLUDE PILOTS, GROUND SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE  
PERSONNEL.

2. ACQ: (24 OCTOBER 1979)

3. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO AMMAN, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, TEHRAN  
(FOR CHIEF OF MISSION, DEFENSE ATTACHE ONLY)

4. WASHINGTON DISSEM:

TO STATE  
TO DIA

EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, INR  
EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES  
AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--  
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR CONSULTANTS--

10

DURING OUR 29 OCTOBER VISIT WITH ARAH, I ASKED HIM ABOUT IRANIAN AID TO FAJAH AND THE SPECIFICS. HE SAID THAT IRAQI ARMS WERE SUPPLIED IN QUANTITY TO THE PERSIAN GULF STATES, INCLUDING IRANS WITH SOME WEAPONS DELIVERING MISSILES, MINES AND EXPLOSIVES. WHEN QUESTIONED AS TO WHETHER OR NOT IRAN WAS PROVIDING FAJAH WITH AMMUNITION, SUCH AS BLANKS, PERSONNEL CARRIERS OR MINE-DETECTORS, ARAH STATED THAT NO HEAVY ARTILLERY WOULD BE PROVIDED. ARAH HAD A GOOD SUPPLY OF WEAPONS AND THAT ALL FAJAH HAD UP ITS MUNITIONS STOCKS. HE ALSO SAID THAT FAJAH WAS TRAINED ON WESTERN WEAPONS, BUT THAT FOR SUCH WEAPONS WOULD BE A PROBLEM IF THEY GOT REEL IN THE HANDS OF IRANIANS' IN WAR.

~~FILE: DEFER. RVN 30 OCT 38 DRV D9C.2 ALL SECRET~~

2 Nov 79 11 39z

S E C R E T 311357Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 54635

TO: WASHINGTON INFO BEIRUT.

FROM: C/NE/IRAN INFO C/NE/SLJ

SUBJECT: WNINTEL INTEL -- PLO DELEGATION TO IRAN

1. COMPLETE LIST OF NAMES OF MID-OCTOBER PLO DELEGATION TO IRAN WAS NEVER PUBLISHED HERE. SDTRAMP/I PROVIDED THE LIST ON 29 OCTOBER; IT IS FORWARDED FOR THE RECORD.

ABU J E H A D, SECOND IN COMMAND TO ARAFAT.

ABU W A L I D, DESCRIBED AS MEMBER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS BUREAU OF "THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION."

SAKHAR ABU N A Z A R, DESCRIBED AS MEMBER OF THE DIRECTORY BOARD OF FATAH RESPONSIBLE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOUTH LEBANON.

COLONEL FAKHR AL H U S S E I N I, DESCRIBED AS A COMMANDER IN SAIGA.

HANI A L - H A S S A N, PLO REP IN TEHRAN.

2. T/I SAID THE Wafa CORRESPONDENT IN TEHRAN TOLD HIM THAT MOHEINI HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN PROVIDING FINANCIAL HELP TO THE PLO (NFI).

3. NO FILE. RVW 31OCT99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.  
S E C R E T

S E C R E T 212200Z NOV 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 544529.

TO: BEIRUT INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL MJBARGE INTEL

REF: NLB-18,692 BEIRUT 54965

1. WISH CONGRATULATE BANASCO ON OBTAINING REF REPORT. IT IS ON A SUBJECT OF HIGH INTEREST AND WAS VERY TIMELY. THE REPORT WAS USED IN THE DCI MORNING NOTES, IN A MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR OF NFAC, AND IN A PDB ANNEX. IT WILL BE GRADED A "10". NEEDLESS TO SAY, WELCOME CONTINUED REPORTING ON THIS TOPIC.

2. FILE: 201-946977. RVW 21NOV99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T  
BT  
#0342

TDPRDA-315/187-2-7

DIST: 1 NOVEMBER 1979

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE  
REPORT CLASS SECRET--INTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN/LIBYA/ARAB STATES

SUBJECT: OBSERVATIONS ON THE SITUATION IN IRAN (DOI: MIDDLE EAST)  
SEPTEMBER 1979

SOURCE: A NON-IRANIAN MILITARY OFFICER WHOSE PAST REPORTING ON OTHER AREAS HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH IRANIAN OFFICIALS AND FROM PERSONAL OBSERVATION.

1. THE DOMESTIC SITUATION IN IRAN IS NOT AS UNEQUIVOCAL AS THE OPPOSITION MEDIA DESCRIBE IT. SECURITY IN THE COUNTRY IS ESTABLISHED, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF KURDISTAN. THE IRANIAN BELIEVE THAT THE UNREST THERE IS THE RESULT OF THE SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYIN FOR THE KURDS. THE IRANIAN CONSIDER HIM THE SOLE ACQUITATOR OF THE KURDISH SITUATION.

2. SOME IRANIANS HAVE COMMENTED THAT MANY IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS MAY BE REPLACED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND PRESIDENT KHAMENEI MAY BE AMONG THEM. THESE IRANIANS EXPECT THE CLIMATE IN IRAN TO CHANGE SOMEWHAT, BUT THE CHANGE WILL BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF AYATOLLAH KHAMENEI, WHO IS THE STRONGEST MAN IN IRAN. ONE IRANIAN OFFICIAL COMMENTED THAT IN RECENT WEEKS THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS PLANNED "SURPRISING THINGS". THEREFORE, THE IRANIANS EXPECT THAT THE NEXT MONTHS WILL BE THOUGHTY AND DIFFICULT BUT THAT ULTIMATELY, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WILL ULTIMATELY WIN THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT WILL WIN.

3. IRANIAN OFFICIALS EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER A CONNECTION BETWEEN FORMER PRIME MINISTER SHAHPOOR BAKHTIYAR, AYATOLLAH KHAMENEI, AND THE RADICAL LAWYERS, ONE OF WHOM IS A FORMER NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY CHAIRMAN. THIS CONNECTION AND HAVE ALREADY STARTED ACTION TO DISSEMINATE INFORMATION AND ALSO INTENT ON BRADICATING THE COMMUNIST PRESENCE IN IRAN AND OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES.

4. THE IRANIANS ARE HARD AT WORK PURGING THE ARMY AND

ORGANIZING IT. THE NEW DEFENSE MINISTER, DR. MUSTAFA CHAMRAN, IS A CIVILIAN WHO WAS PREVIOUSLY IN THE U.S. HE IS MARRIED AND HAS CHILDREN. CHAMRAN LEFT THE U.S. IN 1971 AND JOINED IMAM MOUSA SADAT'S FOLLOWERS. HE WAS APPOINTED AS A MILITARY OFFICIAL IN SADAT'S ARMY AND STAYED WITH THE MOVEMENT UNTIL THE VICTORY OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. HE PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY IN THE REVOLUTION AND CONTRIBUTED TO THE VICTORY. HE WAS ALSO A TEACHER IN A SCHOOL IN TIRE WHILE IN LIBYAN. THE IRANIANS CONSIDER HIM TO BE SMART, TRUTHFUL, AND HIGHLY MORAL. HE IS A TIMELESS WORKER AND VOICES FEEL COMPLAINTS. HE IS ABOUT 47 YEARS OLD AND TALL, TANNED AND PARTIALLY BALD. MUCH IS EXPECTED OF HIS PERFORMANCE WITH THE ARMY IF CONDITIONS PERMIT AND TIME ALLOWS.

5. THE IRANIANS CONSIDER LIBYA TO BE AN ARSENAL OF WEAPONS. THEY ARE AWARE OF THE PRESENCE IN LIBYA OF CUBANS, SOVIETS, ALGERIANS, TURKS AND OTHER NATIONALITIES. ALSO IN LIBYA ARE POLY-COMMUNISMS AND SOVIETS WHO ARE TRAINING AND RECEIVING COMMENTS FROM NUMBERS OF ARABIC AND OTHER COUNTRIES. (HEADQUARTERS AND RETURNING TO THEIR OWN COUNTRIES). THE IRANIANS ALSO PROVIDE MILITARY TRAINING FOR PALESTINIAN AND LIBYAN. SOUTH AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS. THERE ARE ALSO CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL THERE OF WHOM WE ARE AWARE. THERE ARE ALSO APPROXIMATELY 500 CUBAN MEDICAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL AND A NUMBER OF CUBAN CONSTRUCTION WORKERS WHO ARE ARRIVING IN THE FUTURE. THERE ARE ALSO MANY PAKISTANI, ITALIAN AND BANGLADESHI ADVISORY PERSONNEL IN LIBYA.)

6. AC-119 (17 OCTOBER 1979)

7. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, JEDDAH, KUWAIT, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, KATHMAN, TRIPOLI, YERUSALEM.

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